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Removal of Diplomatic Immunity in the extraordinary rendition of 
Abu Omar – Can it be Done? 
By Michael Noonan 
 
 Since the attacks of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent war on terror, the United 
States has been forced to find new means and methods of bringing foreign terrorists to justice. 
One of those methods is the process of extraordinary rendition, by which foreign nationals are 
forcibly taken from their respective countries for interrogation and possible trial in the U.S. 
Abducted targets are often held in CIA controlled “secret prisons” around the world for months 
or years at a time. The target’s family is not told when he is taken, and, despite allegations that 
some nations from which suspected terrorists are taken are implicit in the kidnapping, their own 
governments are typically none the wiser either.
1
 Targets quite simply vanish. This process of 
extraordinary rendition has sparked a multitude of questions of international law and earned the 
condemnation of certain nations.
2
  
 One particular act of extraordinary rendition known to have occurred took place in Milan 
on February 17, 2003. Cleric Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr, or Abu Omar, was abducted by a 
combination of Italian police and American CIA agents while on the way to his mosque. Omar 
was residing in Italy on political asylum from his home country of Egypt. He was taken to 
Germany and from there flown to Egypt. Only the United States’ government was aware of 
Omar’s whereabouts at any point in this process. Omar was then allegedly tortured via electric 
shock for information regarding terrorist activity. He was released after an Egyptian court finally 
ruled his detention unfounded, but questions remain regarding the legal culpability of his captors.  
                                                          
1
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In 2005, warrants were issued throughout the European Union by Italian prosecutors for 
the arrest of 22 suspected CIA operatives.
3
 As they did not appear for trial in Italy, the suspects’ 
trials were held in absentia, with court appointed attorneys representing the absent defendants. 
Attorneys for three of the defendants, Betnie Madero, Ralph Russomando, and Jeffrey Castelli, 
claimed diplomatic immunity. The trial judge acquitted all three on those grounds, but 
prosecutors have appealed the ruling. That appeal is still pending.
4
 
 This paper analyzes the potential criminal liability of Madero, Russomando, and Castelli, 
with a focus on their claims of immunity for the kidnapping of Abu Omar. As will be 
demonstrated, diplomatic immunity no longer serves as a form of absolute immunity in the 
context of liability for international crimes. International standards formed during the twentieth 
century do not allow for evasion of the criminal process quite so easily anymore. It must be 
concluded that a defense of diplomatic immunity will ultimately fail to shield the alleged CIA 
agents from Italian kidnapping charges.  
 This paper begins with a brief historical background of the doctrine of diplomatic 
immunity, leading into a discussion of the type of immunity available and its applicability to the 
present situation. Differing theories regarding the intersection of diplomatic immunity and 
international criminal law will be analyzed, each with varying successes and failures. Finally, the 
changing landscape of immunity defenses over the last century is detailed. Those changes, taking 
place in a far more globalized international community, lead to the conclusion that no one will be 
found above the law, and liability for international crimes must be recognized. 
                                                          
3
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Diplomatic Immunity through History 
 The concept of immunity for foreigners conducting diplomatic missions is a customary 
tradition dating back to ancient times. Greek, Roman, and barbaric tribes all recognized the 
importance of envoys sent from other cities and countries to work out treaties and other 
agreements between powers. Though this customary practice was not always observed, doing 
harm to an envoy was largely considered abhorrent, even at times an act of war.
5
 Envoys were 
sent with the power to speak or negotiate on behalf of a kingdom. Harming them showed a 
willingness to harm the kingdom itself. This understanding and the desire for peace began the 
tradition of letting diplomats move about unbothered.  
 As European countries moved towards concepts of natural and universal law, discussion 
was taken up in earnest regarding the limits, if any, of the inviolability of diplomats. The fear 
that diplomats were only sent to other nations to gather information or otherwise plot against 
them was a very real one. Jurists and kings around the world had varying views on the subject, 
ranging from absolute immunity to simple immunity from trial for wrongs committed prior to 
becoming a diplomat. It was not until the Diplomatic Privileges Act of 1708, passed by the 
English legislature, that the world saw its first attempt to actually codify common law on 
diplomatic immunity.
6
 For the first time, diplomats (in England at least) did not have to fear 
sudden and drastic changes in their legal status on the whim of a ruler. 
 This shift towards normalizing diplomatic immunity has, in modern times, led to the 
creation of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations in 1961. This international treaty 
now creates the basis for diplomatic immunity worldwide. Specifically, Articles 29 and 31 
                                                          
5
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6
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address diplomats’ immunity from suit within a foreign nation’s jurisdiction with limited 
exceptions. Article 31 provides in part: “A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the 
criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State. He shall also enjoy immunity from its civil and 
administrative jurisdiction…”7 Article 31 prevents suit under foreign jurisdiction, but still allows 
for jurisdiction in the sending nation. However, given that sending nations are often reluctant to 
prosecute their own officials, there have been a number of attempts to avoid this preclusion. 
 Attempts to avoid the preclusion of jurisdiction from prosecution of diplomats and other 
privileged state officials have spawned a wide variety of theories on how to do so and spawned 
intense debate on whether it is right to remove absolute immunity from foreign diplomats. In 
practice it could just undo many of the practical benefits that immunity affords while offering 
little in return. Varying jurists have tried to get around such problems by finding new 
justifications or new theories from which to work, but the end goal remains somewhat elusive. 
Theories for the Removal of Diplomatic Immunity 
 The strong desire to prosecute diplomats for their crimes is a basic one with an intense 
emotional appeal, particularly for the country in which the crime took place. Throughout time, 
people have wanted to see wrongs righted, justice done, and the guilty punished. However, that 
desire strongly conflicts with important practical consideration that must be taken into account 
before acting. Theories for the prosecution of diplomats have met this problem with varying 
degrees of success. This paper will focus on a few of the more popular theories for prosecution 
and their limitations.  
                                                          
7
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 The avoidance of show trials is one such limitation. The world of international politics is 
a complicated one in which cultures and national interests frequently collide. Any leverage that 
can be held against a competing nation is extremely valuable, and without immunity a diplomat 
could easily find himself suddenly held under trumped-up charges brought by a bitter receiving 
nation. Such a threat to a diplomat is never well received publicly, often requiring the sending 
nation to cede some position or resource in order to safely bring the diplomat home. The 
complete removal of immunity would incentivize foreign nations to threaten diplomats in hopes 
that they could extort other nations for political and financial gain.  
Diplomatic immunity from criminal prosecution and civil suit also empowers diplomats 
to go about their work. In the same way that executive officers are given immunity so that they 
are not hampered by fears of suit, diplomats are given some peace of mind by their immunity. It 
allows them to concentrate on their missions without constantly also having to consider the legal 
repercussions. Diplomats can act in an otherwise unsure and constantly shifting field without 
fear. Immunity prevents the threat of suit and ensures that diplomatic relations remain open 
between nations, even in otherwise tense times. Theories for the removal of immunity must not 
be so broad that they destroy this highly practical and long standing idea.   
Implied Waiver of Immunity 
 In the wake of WWII, many victims of the atrocities committed by the Axis powers 
sought reparations for their suffering. Many were left with little to nothing, as bank, medical, and 
personal records were often lost or destroyed in the fighting. This created an intense appeal for 
the idea of suing the responsible governments, but the doctrine of sovereign immunity created a 
seemingly insurmountable problem. The concept of sovereign immunity is basic – that 
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individuals may not bring a national government into court without the nation’s consent. This 
principle is meant to give absolute discretion to the sovereign nation, allowing it to choose when 
and for what reasons it must devote time and resources to fighting through the judicial process. 
As it stood, that doctrine largely prevented individuals from bringing the German government 
into civil court for atrocities committed by German occupying forces.  
 This changed in Italian jurisprudence with the Ferrini decision. Luigi Ferrini, an Italian 
citizen, was captured by German forces in August of 1944. He was sent to a forced labor camp 
and later a concentration camp. There, Ferrini suffered physical and psychological trauma at the 
hands of his captors. In 1998, Ferrini petitioned Italian courts for reparation from the German 
government for international crimes committed against him.
8
 That petition was denied at the trial 
and appellate levels, but the Supreme Court reversed, holding that “Germany, by admitting its 
responsibility for such crimes, had implicitly waived such immunity.”9 This waiver is only 
established “if the facts ascertained make it possible to describe specific conduct as 
‘abdicative.’”10 Ferrini recognized that defendant countries are heavily disinclined to voluntarily 
waive their rights and protections from civil suit, and the Italian court found a way to overcome 
such burdens in a morally persuasive manner. 
 The Ferrini test calls for a consideration of the facts and circumstances surrounding an 
alleged waiver of state immunity from suit. This means that one cannot sue simply because they 
were a victim of state action. The facts of the case must specifically infer a waiver of immunity. 
In the context of CIA abductions, the disregard of international law in committing the act could 
be taken as a sign that the United States and its agents waived their own protections by ignoring 
                                                          
8
 Ferrini & SI, 93 Pasqual de Sena & Francesca de Vittor, State Immunity and Human Rights: The Italian Supreme 
Court Decision on the Ferrini Case, 16 The Eur. J. of Int'l L. no. 1, (2005). 
9
 Ferrini v Germany, no 5044/4; ILDC 19 (IT 2004) 11 March 2004. 
10
 Id. at 19. 
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Italian sovereign rights, as well as those of Abu Omar himself. Though Ferrini was a civil case 
pertaining to the right to sue a foreign government, the same principles work in the criminal 
context. The CIA agents were protected by sovereign right, but that right was waived upon 
disregard for the rights of other nations and people. 
 The concept of waiver of sovereign rights is heavily criticized, however. The court 
eschewed an abstract test for waiver in favor of a circumstantial one in an attempt to allay fears 
that the Ferrini test could be used to wrongly persecute people in foreign lands. The theory is 
that if a government entity must consider the specific facts of a case then it will be able to 
objectively consider whether waiver occurred. However, many would argue that such a hope is 
unfounded. The test is inherently subjective in that the judiciary decides, based on no articulated 
factors, whether waiver has been made. A corrupted judiciary could easily weigh what is 
ultimately a balancing test under Ferrini in favor of its government. Application of such a test to 
the criminal context throws open the doors for abuse in show trials that diplomatic immunity is 
intended to protect against.  
 The possible rise of show trials based upon a Ferrini test could severely undermine 
diplomatic relations globally. With separate nations having a variety of different cultural norms 
and opinions, a doctrine based on Ferrini would not even need to be abused in order to create 
disruption and wreak havoc across counties. What is acceptable in one nation may be completely 
taboo in another. The chance that one country misreads another’s moral compass could quickly 
lead not only to an international dispute, but the chance that a national diplomat is imprisoned for 
actions that he believed to be justified. 
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 Application of the Ferrini test to criminal cases also poses a practical procedural 
problem. Claims of diplomatic immunity are typically made at the beginning stages of a case, as 
an affirmative defense to the charges. Ferrini only considered a civil situation, but in order to 
eliminate such a defense in the criminal context a court would necessarily be required to consider 
whether the act waives immunity prior to the trial. A court would, in essence, pre-judge the 
defendant in violation of the most basic norms. There is a very real threat that such a procedure 
would impermissibly “color” the court’s perception of the defendant. A criminal Ferrini test 
carries with it a great threat that defendants will be prejudiced by any pretrial discussion of 
waiver.  
 An obvious counter to this point would be to have the court consider only the act itself, as 
alleged by the state. A well respected, impartial judicial officer could review that charges and 
facts alleged to determine whether the defendant raises a valid claim before returning that 
decision to the trial court. But of course this assumes that true impartiality in light of the facts, 
circumstances, and differing culture viewpoints, can be attained. There would be myriad factors 
to  consider, and appellate courts could easily disagree on which ones hold the greatest weight, 
creating further confusion and holding up a trial for years on appeals. Further, it cannot be 
assumed that a trier of fact, after hearing the determination as to whether the defense stands, 
would not impute some assumption of guilt to the defendant. It is unrealistic to expect that a 
mere curative instruction to a jury would remove any potential bias stemming from that ruling in 
their deliberations. 
 Applying the Ferrini precedent to the CIA kidnapping of Abu Omar would be an 
enormous test to the doctrine. The CIA kidnapped Mr. Omar and transported him first to 
Germany, then to Egypt for interrogation. In applying Ferrini, the question would become to 
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what extent does the doctrine follow defendants. A major potential issue is the fact that the 
agents transported Mr. Omar across multiple countries. The agents may try to argue that Omar’s 
removal from Italy constitutes one crime, and moving him from Germany to Egypt is an entirely 
separate one that German courts must pass judgment upon, if any is to be had. While Ferrini 
dealt with crimes committed against an Italian citizen in another nation, the question of what 
happens when the defendants move across multiple national lines has not been answered.  It is 
possible that the charges follow defendants across national boundaries as part of a continuous 
conspiracy, but equally likely that the affected nations would want to vindicate their own 
interests in the incident. For example, the German government was apparently unaware of Mr. 
Omar’s kidnapping and passage through the country’s borders. Former prosecutors in Germany 
have lamented that they were unable to prosecute anyone for that abduction and others, including 
the abduction of Khaled el-Masri in 2003.
11
  
In the Ferrini case, the court looked to contemporary principles of international law for 
the inference that a nation could implicitly waive its right to immunity. It stated that “recognition 
of immunity from jurisdiction for States that are responsible for such offences is in blatant 
contrast with the normative framework.”12 The court here presumes that the “normative 
framework” for international law must be to see justice done between the parties, without regard 
for the future legal consequences of a decision. While this is certainly a noble position for the 
court to take, it presumes too much about the international community’s values. The Italian high 
court makes its decision without the input of the rest of the world. This is a criticism that is also 
                                                          
11
 Prosecutor on Rendition Case: Kidnapping a 'Disgrace And Should Be Prosecuted', Spiegel Online (Feb. 18, 2013 
2:20 PM), http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/german-prosecutor-recalls-failure-to-probe-cia-rendition-of-
abu-omar-a-884066.html. 
12
 Ferrini v. Germany, at 21. 
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raised in the next potential method for waiving diplomatic immunity from the CIA kidnappers – 
the peremptory norms balancing approach. 
Peremptory Norms Balancing 
 A second approach to removing diplomatic immunity calls for a balancing of norms 
recognized and acknowledged by the international community. This approach is strikingly 
similar to the test under implied waiver of immunity, but is slightly less subjective in that it seeks 
to create a hierarchy of sorts among international standards. Peremptory norms, the most 
important and inalienable of human rights agreed upon by the nations of the world, sit at the top 
of the theoretical pyramid. Under peremptory norms balancing the theory is that any norm below 
a peremptory norm may be ignored for the purposes of vindicating a peremptory norm. In that 
case, “since sovereign immunity itself is a principle of international law, it is trumped” by 
peremptory norms.
13
 Because diplomatic immunity is simply an international norm that is often 
recognized between nations it would lose in priority to more crucial rights such as the right to 
life and the right to freedom from torture.  
 For the defendant CIA agents, a court utilizing the peremptory norms balancing approach 
would weigh their right to immunity against Abu Omar’s right to freedom from torture. The 
ultimate consequence of this balancing would be to abrogate the agents of their immunity and 
permit a prosecuting nation to hold them for a full criminal trial. The overall concept is simplistic 
in this regard – the most important human rights are protected at all costs, and violators cannot 
shield themselves through lesser guarantees. International law demands that ultimately justice be 
done between the parties. 
                                                          
13
 Dapo Akande & Sangeeta Shah, Immunities of State Officials, International Crimes, and Foreign Domestic 
Courts, 21 Eur. J. Int'l L. 815, 833 (2010) 
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 This core concept behind peremptory norms balancing has enormous moral appeal, 
particularly in cases that would be easy to judge such as the CIA kidnapping. Only two 
established norms are clearly involved, and between freedom from torture and immunity the 
choice seems fairly evident in the average moral calculus. To a layperson the question is only 
whether they would prefer one who leads another to be tortured to get away with the crime or 
not. In a more legally oriented mind, the problem is ordering priorities between keeping 
individuals free from torture and respecting traditional immunity for foreign diplomats. Again, 
most would say that freedom from torture is the more important ideal. Peremptory norm 
balancing asks the court to put aside other considerations and only weigh the importance of the 
norms involved.  
 Some courts have found this theory persuasive. In Prosecutor v. Furundzija, a member of 
the Croatian military police force known as the “Jokers” was on trial for ordering the assault and 
rape of detainees during their interrogation. In discussing the jurisdiction for the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the court focused on the paramount 
importance of the detainees right to freedom from torture, stating: 
“it would seem that one of the consequences of the jus cogens character bestowed by the 
international community upon the prohibition of torture is that every State is entitled to 
investigate, prosecute, and punish or extradite individuals accused of torture, who are present in a 
territory under its jurisdiction. Indeed, it would be inconsistent on the one hand to prohibit torture 
to such an extent as to restrict the normally unfettered treatymaking power of sovereign States, and 
on the other hand bar States from prosecuting and punishing those torturers who have engaged in 
this odious practice abroad. This legal basis for States’ universal jurisdiction over torture bears out 
and strengthens the legal foundation for such jurisdiction found by other courts in the inherently 
universal character of the crime.”14 
The ICTY not only emphasizes the importance of the right to freedom from torture in the 
normative hierarchy, but even goes as far as to suggest that this freedom calls for universal 
                                                          
14
 Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija (Trial Judgement), IT-95-17/1-T, International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), 10 December 1998, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/40276a8a4.html [accessed 3 
April 2013] 
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jurisdiction to punish any violators. This would mean that any nation on earth may call a violator 
of such rights to answer for their crimes in court, without regard for any lesser international 
principles. The court notes that it would be highly inconsistent for the international community 
to refer to torture as one of the greatest threats to human rights yet permit an individual to avoid 
repercussions for the crime, and nullifying other rights claimed by the defendant is a 
straightforward, effective means of assuring that one does not escape punishment. 
 A clever argument against this approach is that the norms of diplomatic immunity and 
freedom from torture do not come into conflict unless there is an obligation on third parties to 
prosecute for acts of torture. Without an obligation, prosecution is discretionary and the core 
principles of diplomatic immunity and respect for sovereign nations would counsel a third party 
not to prosecute. Thus, the norms never come into conflict and the peremptory norms hierarchy 
is inapplicable. However, this argument is flawed in the context of the CIA abductions given the 
existence of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading 
Treatment (CAT). Article 7 of the CAT creates an obligation upon signatory states to prosecute 
violations of the CAT.
15
 
This rule was affirmed and clarified in the recent case of Belgium v. Senegal.
16
 The 
Belgian government brought suit in the International Court of Justice against Senegal for not 
either prosecuting or extraditing the former president of Chad, Hissène Habré. Habré stands 
accused of torture and crimes against humanity committed during his presidency. He fled to 
Senegal after the fall of his government and lived there ever since. The Belgian government 
                                                          
15
 UN General Assembly, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, 10 December 1984, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1465, p. 85, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3a94.html [accessed 26 April 2013]. 
16
 Judgment, Questions Concerning the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belg. v. Sen.), Judgment (Jul. 20, 
2012)], available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/144/17064.pdf. 
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alleged that “all states parties to the CAT have an obligation to prevent and punish torture,” and 
that Senegal must either prosecute Habré or extradite him for trial in another signatory state 
capable of prosecuting.
17
  
The ICJ agreed with Belgium’s position, confirming that under Article 7 of the CAT, 
states with jurisdiction over the area that an accused violator of the treaty is located in have a 
duty to prosecute. This applies whether the accused is a national, foreigner, or where the alleged 
crimes took place.
18
 Though in Belgium v. Senegal the Belgian government sought only to force 
Senegal to act in compliance with CAT Article 7’s requirement to prosecute, it can easily be 
inferred from this case that prosecuting acts of torture is in fact an obligation on all signatories 
and an international norm to be followed, perhaps even calling for universal jurisdiction when 
these rights are violated. The norms of diplomatic immunity and freedom from torture can thus 
fall into conflict and be balanced under the peremptory norms hierarchy.  
 The peremptory norms balancing approach receives a fair bit of criticism. Firstly, its 
detractors argue that this point of view is overly simplistic for what in reality is a difficult 
judgment, and its proponents ignore more difficult scenarios. In the case of the CIA kidnapping 
of Abu Omar, the situation could be narrowed to the question of whether one should be able to 
avoid penalties for causing another to be tortured. The truth is that there are many other 
considerations to be made in weighing the agents’ actions. The agents believed that they were 
justified in acting by self-defense motives. There was fear that Omar was a terrorist working 
against the United States, and the hope in capturing him was that Omar would be able to provide 
                                                          
17
 Cindy Galway Buys, Belgium v. Senegal: The International Court of Justice Affirms the Obligation to Prosecute 
or Extradite Hissène Habré Under the Convention Against Torture, 16 AM.J.INT’L L. 29 (2012).   
18
 Judgment, supra note 16, ¶68. 
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information during interrogation that may prevent future harm. There have also been allegations 
that the Italian government was complicit in the kidnapping.  
 This balancing test does not address how the factors mentioned above, only a few of the 
ones involved, affect the ultimate outcome. There is no guidance as to whether only the main 
substantive rights involved may be considered or whether minor factors, such as the intent for 
self-defense, may come into play. A decision could potentially depend upon a series of 
aggravating or mitigating factors, at which point this balancing test can hardly be distinguished 
from the subjective test for implicit waiver. The normative hierarchy works in simple situations, 
but does not adequately address more complicated scenarios presenting a variety of factors such 
Omar’s CIA abduction.  
Another problem in attempting to use the peremptory norms approach comes in trying to 
determine which international norms are peremptory. This question seems clear in certain cases, 
such as those involving genocide, torture, and slavery, but so far no courts have attempted to 
work out which other norms may be peremptory. There exist many rights in the world today, but 
there is no definitive list of which ones rise to the level of peremptory. Should the normative 
hierarchy approach gain favor in the future, courts would need to determine which norms have 
achieved peremptory status, most likely resulting in even more confusing and difficult to apply 
balancing tests. 
 In his critique of the normative hierarchy theory, Lee M. Caplan not only ponders how 
courts would handle a question that has frustrated scholars but also wonders what courts would 
do in a case involving peremptory norms that are not also considered basic human rights.
19
 There 
                                                          
19
 Lee M. Caplan, State Immunity, Human Rights and Jus Cogens: A Critique of the Normative Hierarchy Theory, 
97 AM.J.INT’L L. 741, 772 (2003). 
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exists a valid question of whether peremptory norms not based in human rights would have any 
effect in a legal argument, and if so, just what effect in the case they would have. This is an 
important question that has not at all been addressed. 
 Some international courts, including the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), have 
also displayed hostility towards the idea of a peremptory norms hierarchy. That court addressed 
this idea in the case of Al-Adsani v. The United Kingdom. Mr. Al-Adsani was the victim of 
vicious torture after publicly embarrassing a Kuwaiti Sheik.
20
 When the Britain refused to serve 
a writ on the Kuwaiti government for civil damages on sovereign immunity grounds, Al-Adsani 
appealed to the ECHR claiming that his right not to be tortured had been violated. The Court, in 
a close 9-8 opinion, rejected Al-Adsani’s claim. The majority opinion notes that whether one has 
an actionable claim is subject to procedural bars and other limits to the ability to bring a case. 
The majority went on to say that  
“The Court, while noting the growing recognition of the overriding importance of the prohibition 
of torture, does not accordingly find it established that there is yet acceptance in international law 
of the proposition that States are not entitled to immunity in respect of civil claims for damages for 
alleged torture committed outside the forum State.”21 
As of the Al-Adsani decision, the idea of flatly removing certain rights from alleged violators of 
international norms based on a hierarchy structure was very new, and the Court here displayed 
hesitancy to do so in the face of a traditional and well-established immunity defense, especially 
where only civil and not criminal penalties were called for. 
 Some criticisms applicable to the implied waiver theory work in the context of normative 
hierarchy theories, too. For example, affirming the rights of third party states to remove 
                                                          
20
 Al-Adsani came in possession of personal sexual videotapes while acting as a freedom fighter in the region. He 
was later kidnapped and tortured before escaping to the United Kingdom. 
21
 Al-Adsani v. The United Kingdom, 35763/97, Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights, 21 November 
2001, ¶66, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3fe6c7b54.html [accessed 7 April 2013] 
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diplomatic immunity and prosecute individuals in abstentia denies the right of prosecution from 
the nation that those individuals are residing in. An example of this problem could be seen in 
Belgium v. Senegal. While Belgium very much wanted to prosecute Habré for his crimes, the 
primary right and obligation under the Convention Against Torture laid with Senegal, where 
Habré was residing. While all nations have a strong, natural interest in prosecuting acts of 
torture, opening up the possibility of universal jurisdiction to prosecute via normative hierarchies 
could act to deny a nation of that right. Poorer nations with fewer resources to prosecute may still 
have that strong interest, and the current system affirmed in Bel. v. Sen. prevents richer nations 
from pressuring them to immediately turn over alleged violators. That does not mean that 
violators can hide out in these nations forever though. In Habré’s case, the Court held that 
Senegal ultimately delayed prosecution and opined that it should either prosecute or extradite 
him in the near future. 
The foregoing arguments and critiques place the peremptory norms balancing approach 
in a tumultuous place. Historically, cases such as Al-Adsani suggest that this approach to 
removing immunity is not favorable. However, more recent ones, including Belgium v. Senegal, 
seem to indicate increasing acceptance of the idea that denial of the right to freedom from torture 
must be prosecuted by members of the international community. In the future, normative 
hierarchy theories justifying universal jurisdiction may continue to gain acceptance, but for now 
courts still waiver on whether or not to accept them. A solution to the problem of how to remove 
immunity that is based in written law may be more helpful than a young theory that still needs to 
be expanded upon more by courts. To that end we look to the core of international diplomacy 
and law. 
The Convention Against Torture and the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 
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 Adopted in 1961, the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations outlines the ways in 
which diplomats are to interact with their host countries and vice versa. It sets out the basic law 
of diplomatic immunity to both civil and criminal suit, how to deal with foreign ambassadors, 
and even how to properly declare one persona non grata. For over fifty years the VCDR and its 
protocols have regulated diplomatic relations among signatory countries. As an international 
treaty, signatories can be held accountable in court for violation of its provisions. In regards to 
the CIA abduction of Abu Omar and claims of diplomatic immunity, the VCDR may also 
provide a concrete argument for denying the agents’ claimed defense.  
 Under Article 3 of the VCDR, the drafters attempted to define “diplomatic mission” for 
purposes of the treaty. That Article states in part 
1. The functions of a diplomatic mission consist inter alia in: 
 …(b) protecting in the receiving State the interests of the sending State and of its 
nationals, within the limits permitted by international law.
22 
By its clear language, Article 3 implies that furthering a State’s interest by means not permitted 
by international law cannot be considered a valid diplomatic mission. This raises the questions of 
whether one may qualify as a diplomat with the benefit of immunity when engaged in 
international crimes.  
 At this point it is helpful to look at Article 1 of the VCDR, which includes a few 
definitions for the purpose of understanding and interpreting the treaty as necessary. There, a 
diplomatic agent is defined as “the head of the mission or a member of the diplomatic staff of the 
mission”23 Thus, anyone other than those involved in a valid diplomatic mission within the 
meaning of Article 3 does not qualify as a diplomatic agent and is not entitled to all of the 
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associated privileges. This poses two major questions regarding the CIA abduction: 1. Did the 
agents commit an international crime that would cause their actions to not be considered part of a 
valid diplomatic mission? 2. Could the agents still be immunized from prosecution by some 
other legal means? 
Was an international crime committed by the CIA in abducting Abu Omar? 
 In asking whether an international crime occurred in abducting Abu Omar, one must turn 
to the traditional sources of international law. These sources include customary international law, 
such as laws against piracy, and international treaties. The current extradition treaty between the 
United States and Italy states that “An offense, however denominated, shall be an extraditable 
offense only if it is punishable under the laws of both Contracting Parties by deprivation of 
liberty for a period of more than one year or by a more severe penalty.”24 As such, any felony 
offense in the United States that is similarly punishable in Italy qualifies as an international 
crime between the two countries. The crime of kidnapping is among those, although one might 
argue that the abduction of Omar does not qualify as kidnapping by the United States’ standards. 
The CIA was acting to capture a suspected terrorist for interrogation, and so there would be no 
violation of U.S. law. If Italian authorities in fact aided in Omar’s rendition there may not be a 
violation of Italian law either. 
 If the extradition treaty between Italy and the United States in unhelpful in defining 
abductions as an international crime, then customary international law is even less helpful to that 
end. While abduction is certainly a violation of human rights, it has rarely been considered an 
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international crime except in specific circumstances.
25
 Those circumstances typically include 
abduction for the purposes of slavery, abduction amount to a war crime, or a crime against 
humanity. The rendition of an individual, in this case Abu Omar, is unlikely to reach the 
necessary level to be considered an international crime under customary law. 
 There is another argument that an international crime occurred which does not depend 
upon matching similar crimes together or looking to customs.  That argument looks back to the 
Convention Against Torture. CAT Article 3 states that “No State Party shall expel, return 
("refouler") or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for 
believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.”26 This means that a state 
cannot, under the CAT, force an individual to go to a nation that there is a reasonable belief he or 
she will be tortured in. The drafters of the CAT believed it important that not only they protect 
individuals from direct persecution, but also prevent nations from simply outsourcing torture to 
other countries. 
 Recall that after his initial abduction in Milan, Abu Omar was flown to Germany, and 
from there transported to Egypt. Omar had been living in Milan, Italy on political asylum from 
Egypt since 2001. Egypt believed him to be a member of the rebellious al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya 
organization. Because of this, Omar arguably faced the threat of torture simply by being sent 
back to Egypt. Even more important is the agents intent when they took Omar. If the intent was 
to bring Omar to Egypt for the purpose of interrogating him by torturous methods, then the 
question of whether there were substantial grounds for believing Omar would be tortured is 
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answered affirmatively, and the agents violated the CAT’s prohibition of refouler, an 
international crime.  
  The traditional use of CAT Article 3 has been to protect migrants to new countries from 
being deported back to states where they fear political reprisals. There has been a great deal of 
litigation and formulation of legal tests around this use. Both the traditional use and language of 
Article 3 regarding State Parties would seem to limit its application to holding the state that an 
individual is sent from responsible. One could argue that Italy was responsible for Abu Omar’s 
rendition to Germany, where he had no fear of torture, but sending him to Egypt, where there 
was a well-founded fear, was the fault of the German government. This argument places the 
blame for Omar’s refoulment on a third party and absolves the CIA agents of responsibility. 
However, this theory ignores the intent of Article 3 and is little more than a smoke-and-mirrors 
cover for the actions of the United States and its agents.  
 Regardless of whether or not Italy was implicit in Abu Omar’s rendition, the ultimate fact 
is that Omar was transported to Aviano air-force base, before being flown to Germany by agents 
of the United States.
27
 In Germany he was held in secret such that not even the German 
government was aware of his temporary presence in the country.
28
 From there, U.S. agents again 
moved Omar, this time to Egypt. To claim that the German government was responsible for this 
is simply a fallacy. Article 3’s reference to “State Parties” should not be interpreted so strictly as 
to only apply to the nation that an individual is refouled from. In the abduction case, Omar was 
very clearly refouled through the actions of the United States only, with Germany only being 
involved as an innocent third party taken advantage of for that purpose. The United States should 
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have to pay the price for refoulment, and its agents held responsible for intentionally committing 
an international crime under the Convention Again Torture. 
Could the agents still be protected from prosecution? 
 While there seems to be little doubt that an international crime took place when Mr. 
Omar was kidnapped, the agents involved may still be protected by other international 
agreements. In particular, Italy and the United States hold a Status of Forces Agreement through 
NATO, creating a number of treaty obligations to be followed. A SOFA instructs courts as to 
how the domestic laws of a receiving state may apply to foreign military personal. Such 
agreements have a long history, and generally hold that the laws of a sending state follow its 
military. Receiving states generally do not have jurisdiction to act against foreign military 
personnel, even in criminal cases. As was discussed earlier, these agreements bring form to the 
idea that it is primarily a sending country’s right to punish its own citizens under certain 
circumstances. Military members are often punished for their actions abroad in courts martial or 
are returned home to face other charges. The extent of this waiver is unclear, but we will now 
discuss the SOFA’s history and theories under which it could or could not apply to rendition. 
 One tragic case that became an international incident can shed some light on how Italy 
and the United States interpret this agreement. In 1998, a Marine aircraft flying over Italy 
severed the cables holding a gondola, killing twenty passengers inside. Italian prosecutors 
immediately began a prosecution of the Marines at fault, but met stiff resistance from the United 
States, which claimed that under the SOFA it alone had jurisdiction to try the Marines in a 
military court. SOFA Article VII confirms that concurrent jurisdiction exists under the 
agreement, though the sending state retains jurisdiction for “offences arising out of any act or 
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omission done in the performance of official duty.”29 Thus, the argument became whether the 
Marines were acting in the course of their official duties when the accident occurred. In drafting 
the agreement, Italy had requested a more precise definition of official duties, but the wording 
was eventually left vague anyway. Italy has never officially ceded its position that official duties 
should pertain only to orders given by officers. Meanwhile, the vague definition in the Status of 
Forces agreement has enabled the U.S. to take any position that it chooses.
30
 
 The CIA agents who abducted Abu Omar may wish to take the position that they were 
simply military personnel acting within the scope of legal duties at the time. Thus, though 
jurisdiction is considered concurrent under the Status of Forces Agreement, the United States 
would retain primary jurisdiction over their case and would most likely choose not to press 
criminal charges. In the gondola incident, Italy eventually permitted the United States as a 
sending state to determine whether the flight crew was acting pursuant to official order. If history 
is on the CIA agents’ side, it will do the same again. However, Italian prosecutors have 
occasionally been upset by this waiver of jurisdiction, and may petition the government not to 
cede jurisdiction if they feel particularly strongly about the case. This could lead to tension, 
creating political upheaval and unpredictable legal results. 
 If the agents wished to claim that they were acting on legal duties, the United States 
would be hard pressed to make such an argument. If successful, that argument would allow a 
state to justify its agents’ actions in violation of international law on the grounds that they were 
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simply “following orders.”31 This is not an acceptable defense in the modern age. It would be 
strange indeed if modern international law stemmed from the Nuremberg trials where this exact 
defense was found inexcusable, yet sixty years later it were considered acceptable. Chris Jenks 
and Eric Jenson attempt to justify this position by stating that “acting pursuant to orders is a 
fundamental component of the determination that his acts or omissions arose out of the 
performance of official duties, duties that include following lawful orders.”32 However, this 
argument is fatally flawed in that the authors assume any order given is a lawful order. If this 
were the case, then international law would be ineffective except where military officers acted 
entirely independent of their superiors. There could be no accountability for actors who commit 
war crimes committed under an official order, which is certainly an untenable position. 
 There is a final, rather large hole to note in the argument that the CIA agents would be 
protected from Italian prosecution by the NATO SOFA. The agreement only refers to military 
personnel in the receiving state. In order for the agreement to apply, one must be able to 
characterize the CIA agents as such. It is possible to argue that the agents were acting in a 
military-like function, capturing a potential enemy for the safety and security of their country, 
but U.S. law, as well as the NATO SOFA, itself limit the definition of military personnel such 
that it cannot include the agents. Under the United States Code, “[t]he term ‘armed forces’ means 
the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard.”33 Members of the CIA do not 
qualify. Meanwhile, Note 35 to Article I of the Status of Forces Agreement defines military 
personnel as belonging to the land, sea, or air armed services of a nation. This traditional 
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definition cannot be applied to the agents. The CIA agents do not qualify for protection under the 
NATO Status of Forces Agreement. 
 Using the foregoing information, one can see that the abducting agents who have 
declared diplomatic immunity are plainly liable for their actions in Milan. Under the Convention 
Against Torture, the agents committed refoulment by sending Omar to Egypt, where it was 
certain that he would be a victim of torture whether it was at the hands of the CIA or government 
agents in his own country. Such a crime removes the agents’ claim of diplomatic immunity under 
the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, as the commission of an international crime 
cannot be considered part of a diplomatic mission by VCDR Article Three and one must be on a 
diplomatic mission to be defined as a diplomat under that treaty. Finally, the agents cannot be 
protected by the Status of Forces Agreement between Italy and the United States. The agents do 
not qualify as military personnel and modern international law does not recognize a “following 
orders” defense. The defense of diplomatic immunity for the abduction of Abu Omar necessarily 
fails so long as intentional refoulment is considered a violation of international law.  
Conclusion 
 The world of international law is a complicated one, and even more so when political 
beliefs and values are weighed against the laws and principles that people have designed for their 
selves. There is little doubt that the United States, in giving CIA agents Madero, Russomando, 
and Castelli their missions meant to safeguard itself from future attack and the horrors of 
September 11, 2001. This is an extremely relatable position, but the method chosen came with a 
complete disregard for the rules of international law that have been so carefully crafted over 
decades of work and debate. Those lessons cannot be discarded out of fear and justifying by self-
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protection. The rules of international law apply to all people and in all situations. The challenge 
is to find a way to protect the future without erasing the past. 
 As has been shown, the CIA’s actions in the abduction of Abu Omar are incompatible 
with case law and cannot be defended by hiding behind the shield of immunity. While the United 
States will likely refuse any request to extradite the accused agents to Italy, understanding how 
international law can adapt to new situations is an important scholastic exercise that may become 
relevant at some future date. In reacting to the war on terror and its international scope, courts 
will need to process theories such as implied waiver of right and potential peremptory norms 
hierarchies. These concepts may help to spur new ideas and new legislation worldwide to help 
the nations of the world cope with the realities of terrorism in a fashion that does not trample 
upon the rights and obligations that it has already established.  
Alternatively, courts may instead choose to rely upon written law in the form of the 
Convention Against Torture and other international treaties. Such laws will need to be expanded 
upon to overcome new defenses and situations, but courts are capable of doing so. The law 
cannot be so narrowly read that it is incapable of reacting to changed circumstances. Courts must 
apply not only their knowledge of the law as it has been decided, but understand the spirit of 
those laws and be wary of the environment that they were created in. It is defies rational thought 
to believe that sixty years after Nuremberg a defense of following orders would be permitted to 
stand in the face of serious violations of international law and human rights. Time will tell 
whether such issues can be successfully resolved by state actors out of court, or whether states 
will turn to international law to answer the pressing question of how to appropriately handle 
changing global circumstances. 
